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ANALYSING A CONSULTANT'S COMPETITIVENESS IN TWO 
ENVELOPE FEE TENDERING 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A method for analysing the competitiveness of a consultant's two-envelope fee tendering 
history is proposed and illustrated in an application to one of Hong Kong’s larger quantity 
surveying practices.  Separate measures for determining consultants’ fee, quality score and 
overall competitiveness are considered to accommodate the special nature of the Hong Kong 
system which makes cross-auction comparisons impossible.  Maximum fee competitiveness 
is assumed to be the lowest submitted tender fee while maximum quality score 
competitiveness is taken to be the highest quality score attained by a competing consultant. 
Fees and quality score are then expressed as separate competitiveness ratios relative to these 
maximums and aggregated for determining overall competitiveness. 
 
In analysing bidding performance it was found that this consultant’s fee, quality score and 
overall competitiveness are all above the competitor average.  These competitiveness 
measures reveal large differences in variability between quality score and fees with quality 
score variability being considerably lower.  Such a large imbalance in competitiveness 
variability effectively discounts quality and promotes the influence of the fee since 
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competitiveness ratio differences between fees are much larger than the competitiveness 
ratio differences between quality scores.  
 
Keywords: bidding, competitiveness, consultant, fee, quality, tendering 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In several countries, competitive fee tendering is gaining popularity in the construction 
industry as a mechanism for allocating work to consultants such as architects, engineers and 
surveyors.  For example, Hoxley (1998) concluded that competitive fee tendering is the 
most popular method of appointing quantity surveyors in the UK while in Hong Kong 89% 
of quantity surveying consultancy work is allocated in this way (Drew et al, 2000).   Most 
consultancy contracts are awarded on the basis of price and quality since it is recognised that 
a quality service cannot be obtained if just the lowest tender is accepted (The Consultant 
Quantity Surveyors Association, 1992).  
 
In order to compete effectively, it is important for consultants to regularly analyse their 
tendering performance in terms of competitiveness.  In addition to having an appreciation of 
their overall competitiveness consultants need to regularly analyse their fee and quality 
score competitiveness to compare the competitiveness effect of their fee levels and quality 
scores in securing work.  This is a situation similar to construction bidding research in 
general, where it has long been considered practical to improve tendering performance by 
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studying one’s own results in relation to the winning tender which is, without exception, 
assumed to be the lowest tender submitted (eg., Beeston, 1983).  It is worth noting that this 
is despite the fact that the lowest tender may, on occasion, consist of a cover price, be 
misconceived or contain errors. 
 
Analysing the competitiveness in terms of both price and quality of consultants has special 
difficulties in drawing conclusions over a series of tenders.  In particular the two-envelope 
system adopted by the Hong Kong SAR Government makes comparison between auctions 
virtually impossible.  This paper suggests a means of overcoming these problems.  This is 
illustrated through the analysis of the tendering performance of one of Hong Kong’s larger 
quantity surveying consultants in terms of (1) fee competitiveness, (2) quality score 
competitiveness and (3) overall competitiveness. Using a modified price-quality aggregation 
formulation, the consultant’s competitiveness performance is compared with that of (1) the 
average competitor and (2) the lowest tenderer.  This highlights the potential use of the 
method in providing useful reference points for the consultant in making future decisions on 
whether to lower (or increase) fees and / or aim for a higher (or lower) quality score.  Also 
highlighted is the large difference in variability between price and quality scores. 
 
 
THE TWO ENVELOPE METHOD 
 
The Construction Industry Council (1998) list five basic methods of consultant selection in 
which price is considered in the decision process.  These are (1) the two envelope method, 
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(2) the cost weighted method, (3) the budget method, (4) design competition with prices and 
(5) price negotiation.  The two-envelope method is endorsed by organisations such as the 
Construction Industry Council who have actively promoted its development (Construction 
Industry Council, 1994), and is the most popular method in awarding contracts to 
consultants in the UK (Connaughton, 1994) and Hong Kong.  Essentially competing 
consultants are required to submit two envelopes; one envelope containing the fee (usually a 
lump sum) and the other containing information about quality such as: 
• practice or company related information (e.g. total number of professionally qualified 
employees, number of years the practice or company has been in business, practice or 
company turnover, largest contract handled by the company over the past five years) 
• project organisation (e.g. how the proposed work is to be shared amongst the project 
personnel) 
• project personnel (e.g. identity, qualifications and number of years of relevant 
experience) 
• project execution (e.g. programme of work showing frequency of site meetings etc) 
 
The quality envelope of each competitor is opened first and each quality criterion is marked 
out of 100.  Each quality criterion is weighted according to the project requirements and a 
weighted mark is produced for each quality criterion.  This is then aggregated to produce a 
total quality mark out of 100. 
 
After producing a total quality mark for each competitor, the second envelope containing the 
price is then opened.  A price mark is then determined for each competitor.  The total quality 
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mark and price mark are then aggregated according to the client's formulation to allow the 
consultant to be selected.  These are compared below. 
 
 
The Hong Kong SAR Government formulation 
 
In determining which consultant to award the contract, competing consultants are ranked 
according to their technical (quality) points score and compared on a pair-wise basis.  The 
example given in the Hong Kong SAR Government’s handbook (Hong Kong Government 
1993) on appointment of consultants reads: 
 
The first ranked firm is compared with the second ranked firm as follows: 
 
Consultant Technical Total Fee   Technical          Fee 
   Points        ($m)  Comparison       Comparison 
 
A  82  5.43  (82-76)/76 (5.43-5.14)/5.14 
B  76  5.14   =7.89%  =5.64% 
 
A is 7.89% technically better than B but 5.64% less advantageous than B on fee. Weighting 
technical advantage at 0.7 and fee advantage at 0.3 gives a weighted technical advantage of 
A over B of 0.7 x 7.89% = 5.52% and a weighted fee disadvantage of A compared with B of 
0.3% x 5.64% = 1.69%.  The difference 5.52%-1.69% is greater than zero so A is therefore 
the winner (the reverse would be true in the case of a negative difference). 
 
The winner is then compared with the third ranked firm in a similar manner: 
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Consultant Technical Total Fee   Technical            Fee 
   Points     ($m)  Comparison     Comparison 
 
A  82  5.43  (82-69)/69 (5.43-4.42)/4.42 
C  69  4.42   = 18.84%  =22.85% 
 
In this case, A is 18.84% technically better than C but 22.85% less advantageous than C on 
fee.  The weighted technical advantage of A over C is: 0.7 x 18.84% = 13.19%.  The 
weighted fee disadvantage of A compared with C is: 0.3 x 22.85% = 6.86%.  Once again A, 
with a positive difference, is the overall winner.       
 
The implied model is therefore is that the overall competitiveness percentage 
 
 CH = 100{Wq(qa-qb) /qb - Wf (fa – fb)/fb} (1) 
 
where 
 
Wq = predetermined weighting for quality score 
qa = Consultant A’s quality score 
qb =  Consultant B’s quality score 
Wf = predetermined weighting for fees 
fa =  Consultant A’s fee 
fb = Consultant B’s fee 
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A positive CH value indicates that the consultant with the higher quality score wins while a 
negative percentage difference indicates that the consultant with the lower fee is the wins.  A 
major disadvantage, however, in using this approach is that an overall comparison of 
consultants is not possible since the numerators and denominators change according to 
the pair-wise combination of consultants being compared.  
 
 
Other formulations 
 
Connaughton (1994) has summarised a variety of price-quality aggregation formulations.  
These are described as either by simple weightings or by prior weightings.  The simple 
weightings approach includes three alternative models (Connaughton, 1994: Appendix J): 
 
 C1 = 100f/q (2) 
where 
 
f = consultant’s fee 
q = consultant’s quality score 
 
The consultant with lowest C1 value winning the contract. 
 
 
 C2 = fminq/qfmin– f (3) 
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where 
 
fmin  =  lowest fee  
qfmin  =  quality score of consultant with lowest fee  
 
The consultants with negative C2 values are eliminated and the process repeated with the 
remaining consultants until all but one is eliminated. 
 
 
 C3 = q/qmax + fmin/f (4) 
 
The consultant with the highest C3 value winning the contract.  
 
 
The prior weighting of quality score and price is as follows: 
 
 C4 = Wqq/qmax + Wf fmin/f (5) 
 
The consultant with the highest C4 value winning the contract. 
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The Construction Industry Council (1994) also recommends separating quality score and 
fees according to predetermined weightings.  Essentially, they advocate that the fee is 
combined with the quality score as a weighted percentage above the lowest bid i.e. 
 
 C5 = qWq – 100Wf (f - fmin)/fmin) + 100 (6) 
 
The consultant with the highest C5 value winning the contract. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
As Connaughton (1994) observes, although eqn (2) is simple to understand and calculate it 
does not provide a relative dollar value of the technical quality score.  Eqn (3) attempts to do 
this.  However, the disadvantages of eqn (3) are that each unit of quality score is assumed to 
have the same monetary value and the quality score baseline varies according to the 
consultant who submits the lowest fee.  Eqns (4) and (5) appear to be an improvement on 
eqn (3) since quality and fees are assessed separately and according to a constant baseline 
(i.e. highest quality score and the lowest fee).  A problem, however, in assessing quality and 
fees separately is that the parameter with the greatest variability will influence the outcome 
in selecting the consultant for contract award.  In other words, the more the fees vary 
relative to quality score the more fees will influence consultant selection and vice versa.  
The weightings, Wf and Wq, can be used to control this to a limited extent as they have to be 
fixed in advance by the procurer.  
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In addition to eqns (4) and (5) the unequal variability problem will also most likely occur 
with eqns (1) and (6) since fees and quality scores are also assessed separately in these 
equations.  Lam (2000) has shown that the high fee variability and low quality score 
variability can be so extreme, that even changing the predetermined quality/ fee weightings 
from as much as 70% / 30% (Wf=0.7 Wq=0.3) to 50%/50% (Wf=0.5 Wq=0.5) has little 
effect on influencing which consultant is awarded the contract.  Consequently, Lam 
recommends reducing the fee variability by giving all the consultants whose fees are lower 
or equal to average fee the same score for the fee component of the bid.  
 
Interestingly the Construction Industry Council (1998) comment that once price is 
introduced, the consultant selection becomes biased in favour of the lowest fee rather than 
quality (i.e. technical quality score) and it often dominates the objective assessment of the 
other factors.  Therefore they recommend a move away from fee tendering to a negotiation 
approach in which the scope of services is first agreed and then an appropriate fee 
negotiated. 
 
The general tender analysis literature was consulted in the search for further models.  Here, a 
recurring theme is the nature of baseline used.  Potential baselines include the designer’s 
estimate, contractor’s cost estimate and the mean, median or lowest of the tenders entered 
for a particular contract.  Of these, the lowest tender has the advantage that at the time of 
tendering it represents the maximum level of competitiveness.  Thus, by using the lowest 
tender as a baseline, other tenders can be expressed as a percentage or ratio to this lowest 
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tender baseline.  Using the maximum value of competitiveness means that all 
competitiveness values will be on an absolute scale and easier to understand.  Also, in 
comparing percentage and ratio competitiveness measures, Drew and Skitmore (1997) have 
also shown that the ratio measure is easier to calculate and more adaptable to 
transformation.  This suggests that, in the case of  fee competitiveness, a suitable baseline is 
the lowest fee tendered.  For quality competitiveness, the highest possible quality score of 
100 could be used. However, it is unlikely that any firm will ever be awarded a perfect 
quality score of 100.  This is, therefore, rejected in favour of the more consistent approach of  
using the highest attained quality score.  Thus, the closer a competing consultant’s fee is to 
the lowest fee, the greater the fee competitiveness and the greater a competing consultant’s 
quality score is to the highest quality score attained by a competing consultant, the greater 
the quality competitiveness.  This leads to a new model where the overall competitiveness of 
the consultant is found by adding fee competitiveness and quality competitiveness together 
and expressing the result in either in percentage terms or as a ratio.  The competitiveness 
equation (with predetermined weightings) expressed in percentage terms is as follows:  
 
 C6 = 100{Wq(qmax-q)/q + Wf (f - fmin)/fmin} (7) 
 
Lower C6 values indicate greater competitiveness and vice versa with minimum and 
maximum competitiveness being constrained respectively between infinity and zero. 
 
In its ratio form this equation can be taken to be that as shown in eqn (5), with higher ratio 
values indicating greater competitiveness and vice versa.  In this case, overall minimum and 
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maximum competitiveness is constrained between zero and one respectively.  Maximum 
quality and fee competitiveness are equal to their predetermined weightings.  There is, 
however, an inconsistency in eqn (5) in that the highest quality score (i.e. maximum quality 
competitiveness) is the denominator whereas the lowest fee (i.e. maximum fee 
competitiveness) is the numerator.  This can be overcome by inverting the quality ratio and, 
in order to make sense of the aggregating, deducting the fee ratio from the quality score ratio 
i.e.  
 
 C7 = Wq qmax/q - Wf fmin/f (8) 
 
Lower C7 values indicating greater competitiveness and vice versa. 
 
Although eqn (8) is consistent in that both maximum quality competitiveness and maximum 
fee competitiveness are numerators it suffers from a disadvantage that consultants’ overall 
competitiveness becomes distorted when compared to eqn (5).  For example, suppose 
Consultant D submits a fee of $4.62 million and obtains a quality score of 73.  With a C4 of 
0.910, Consultant D is more competitive than Consultant B who achieved a C4 of 0.906.  
Now compare this with eqn (8).  With a C7 of 0.499, Consultant D is less competitive than 
Consultant B who achieved an C7 of 0.497. 
 
Table 1 summarises the results obtained in using all 8 equations together with Lam's (2000) 
method (eqn (9)).  In making comparisons, the following observations are made: 
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• In analysing competitiveness, it is vital that consultants’ competitiveness reflects, as 
closely as possible, the aggregation method used by clients since this forms the basis on 
which the contracts are awarded. 
• Although the fee and quality competitiveness ratios are not consistently measured in eqn 
(5), there is at least some evidence in the literature to suggest that some clients aggregate 
quality and fee ratios based on eqn (5). 
• There appears to be no evidence in the literature of client’s using eqn (8). 
• Eqn (5) also has the advantages over eqn (8) that it is easier to understand (since there 
are no deductions) and maximum competitiveness is fixed at unity (rather than varying 
according to the difference between the predetermined weightings). 
 
For these reasons, eqn (5) is used in the analysis in preference to eqn (8). 
 
 
COMPETITIVENESS RELATIVE TO THE LOWEST TENDERER AND THE 
AVERAGE COMPETITOR 
 
A consultant’s (1) fee competitiveness, (2) quality competitiveness and (3) overall 
competitiveness can each be determined and compared against the fee, quality and overall 
competitiveness of the lowest tenderer and the average competitor.   
 
The competitiveness of the lowest tenderer can simply be found by substituting the 
consultant’s tender fee and consultant’s quality score for that of the lowest tenderer.  The 
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average competitor is the average of all the competitors’ fees and quality scores. The 
average competitor concept is particularly useful where the data sample is relatively small 
and /or the identities of the competitors are unknown (Park and Chapin, 1992). 
 
A consultant’s competitiveness, the lowest tenderer competitiveness and average competitor 
competitiveness can then each be averaged over a series of competitions.  Competitiveness 
variability can be gauged from the resultant standard deviations and coefficient of variations. 
 
 
DATA SET  
 
The data sample is from one of Hong Kong’s larger quantity surveying practices and 
comprises competitive fee tendering feedback information relating to 17 Hong Kong SAR 
Government quantity surveying consultant fee contracts tendered for between December 
1995 to June 1999.  All of the competing consultants have been assigned a code to preserve 
anonymity.  The quantity surveying firm whose bidding performance has been analysed is 
coded 16.  
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Firm 16’s bidding performance is first introduced by identifying the number of competing 
consultants, Firm 16’s ranking and number of successes.  Firm 16’s quality, fee and overall 
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competitiveness (measured in accordance with eqn (5)) is then analysed and compared to 
that of the average tenderer and lowest tenderer. 
 
 
Number of competing consultants, Firm 16’s ranking and number of successes 
 
Table 2 shows the number of competing consultants being fixed at 3 for 13 contracts and 7 
for the remaining 4 contracts.  Firm 16 was successful in securing 6 of the 17 contracts 
(even though for two contracts this consultant was ranked second).  Based the number of 
competing consultants and number of competitions the average success rate is 4.92 (i.e. 13/3 
+ 4/7).  Firm 16’s tendering performance in terms of success is therefore above average.  
 
 
Firm 16’s quality competitiveness 
 
Table 3 shows Firm 16’s quality competitiveness ranging between 0.700 (maximum 
competitiveness) and 0.642.  By counting the number of 0.700 scores it can be seen that 
Firm 16 obtained the highest quality score in five of the seventeen competitions.  Overall, 
Firm 16’s average quality competitiveness of 0.683 is above the competitor average of 
0.678.  Further evidence of Firm 16’s competitiveness being better than the competitor 
average can be seen by considering difference between the two variables.  It can be seen that 
in only five of the seventeen competitions was Firm 16’s quality competitiveness below the 
competitor average.  This is indicated by a negative difference.  Interestingly four of the five 
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occurrences were in the earlier years before 1997.  It would seem, therefore, that Firm 16’s 
quality scores have, on average, improved slightly faster than their competitors.  
 
Now compare Firm 16’s quality competitiveness with that of the lowest tenderer.  With 
identical average scores of 0.683, it can be seen that Firm 16 has managed to at least equal 
the quality competitiveness ratio score of the lowest tenderer.  Again, by comparing the 
difference between Firm 16’s quality competitiveness and that of the lowest competitor, it 
can be seen that Firm 16 was more competitive than the lowest competitor in nine of 
seventeen competitions. 
 
 
Firm 16’s fee competitiveness 
 
Turning to fee competitiveness, it can be seen in Table 4 that Firm 16’s fee competitiveness 
ranges between 0.300 (maximum competitiveness) and 0.155.  Firm 16 submitted the lowest 
fee on four occasions and submitted a fee lower than the competitor average on ten 
occasions.  Overall, Firm 16’s average fee competitiveness ratio score of 0.250 is slightly 
better the competitor average of 0.247.  However, 0.250 is far below the average fee of the 
lowest tenderer fee ratio of 0.288.  Despite this, Firm 16 did manage to submit a fee lower or 
equal to that of the lowest tenderer in six competitions. 
 
  
 17
 
Firm 16’s overall competitiveness 
 
Table 5 shows Firm 16’s overall competitiveness ranging between 1.000 to 0.855.  Firm 
16’s average overall competitiveness is slightly higher than that of the average competitor 
competitiveness.  The difference is 0.008 (or 0.80%).  By submitting the lowest fee and 
obtaining the highest quality score in the same competition, Firm 16 did manage to obtain a 
maximum overall competitiveness score of 1.00.  Firm 16’s overall competitiveness is 
higher than that of the average competitor in ten of the seventeen competitions.  
 
In comparing Firm 16’s competitiveness with that of the lowest competitor it can be seen 
that Firm 16’s competitiveness is 0.037 (i.e. 3.7%) below the lowest competitor.  The zero 
difference indicates that Firm 16 was the most competitive consultant on four occasions. 
 
 
Differences in competitiveness variability 
 
When comparing quality and fee competitiveness in Tables 3 and 4 a particularly striking 
feature is the large difference in competitiveness variability.  In Table 3 it can be seen that 
the coefficient of variation for Firm 16’s and average competitor quality competitiveness is 
only 2.49 and 2.21 respectively yet the corresponding fee competitiveness values in Table 4 
are 18.80 and 19.43.  This indicates that fee competitiveness varies some eight times more 
than quality competitiveness. 
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With such an imbalance in variability, there would seem to be little point for Firm 16 (or any 
of the other consultant firms) attempting to improve their quality scores since 
competitiveness differences between consultant quality scores are much smaller when 
compared to that of fees.  Therefore, if Firm 16 (or any of the other consultant firms) wishes 
to make a marked improvement on its competitiveness it appears that the best route under 
the current system is to lower fees. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Consultant fee tenders are commonly awarded based on price and quality and this paper 
describes the development of a method by which a consultant may analyse its tender 
performance in comparison with competitors. A major disadvantage of the Hong Kong SAR 
Government’s fee tendering system is that the price-quality aggregation formula makes an 
overall comparison of consultants impossible since the numerators and denominators change 
according to the pair-wise combination of consultants being compared.  This problem is 
overcome by selection of an alternative formulation in which the maximum competitiveness 
in each competition is taken to be the lowest submitted fee and highest attained quality 
score.  The consultant’s competitiveness in terms of fee and quality is expressed as a ratio 
relative to these maximums and aggregated.  Apart from being simpler to understand and 
providing uniform basis for overall comparison, this competitiveness measure is more 
flexible in that additional parameters (e.g. current client workload) can be more easily added 
to the competitiveness equation, if required. 
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A method is then proposed in which the target consultant's performance measured in this 
way is compared with that of the average competitor and lowest tenderer.  This is illustrated 
by the analysis of  real data provided by a major Hong Kong consulting firm.  The results of 
this analysis (based on a sample of 17 contracts) show the firm to be above average not only 
in terms of success but also according to fee, quality and overall competitiveness.  The firm 
has done particularly well in terms of quality competitiveness. The firm’s quality scores also 
appear to have improved at a slightly faster rate than their competitors. 
 
Although the purpose here is to describe a method for analysing individual performance, 
one aspect of possible generality arising out of the analysis is the large difference between 
fees and quality scores in terms of competitiveness variability.  The low variability in quality 
competitiveness, when compared to the fee competitiveness variability, is the result of ratio 
differences between quality scores being much smaller than the ratio differences between 
fees.  Such a large disparity in variability between fees and quality scores effectively 
discounts quality and promotes the influence of fee.  Whether or not a firm is successful in 
securing a contract would, therefore, appear to be not so dependent on the quality score 
attained but on the fees submitted.  This is likely to lead to consultants adopting low fee 
strategies which, in turn, is likely to lead to a gradual deterioration in the quality of service.  
 
A possible remedy to promote the influence of the quality component might be to increase 
the predetermined weighting in favour of quality (as suggested by Connaughton, 1994).  
Another is to reduce the fee variability by giving all consultants whose fees are lower or 
 20
 
equal to the average fee the same score for the fee component of the tender (as suggested by 
Lam 2000).  An alternative approach (suggested by the Construction Industry Council, 
1998) may be to abandon fee tendering altogether in favour of a negotiation approach in 
which the scope of services is agreed and then an appropriate fee negotiated.  
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   Equation 1 (70/30) 
 
Equation 2 Equation 3 
Consultant 
Identity 
Quality 
Mark 
Fee $M Quality 
Score 
Fee Score Total 
Score 
Pairwise 
Winner 
 
Multiplier Weighted 
Fee Bid 
Rank Weighted Fee Difference Rank 
A 82 5.43 5.52 1.69 3.83 AvB=A 1.220 6.625 3 6.451 1.021 1 
B 76 5.14 13.19 6.86 6.33 AvC=A 1.316 6.764 4 5.659 0.519 2 
C 69 4.42 8.63 5.26 3.73 AvD=A 1.449 6.405 2 4.420 0 4 
D 73 4.62     1.370 6.329 1 4.888 0.268 3 
   Equation 4 
 
Equation 5 (70/30) Equation 6 (70/30) 
Consultant 
Identity 
Quality 
Mark 
Fee $M Quality 
Score 
Fee Score Total 
Score 
Rank 
 
 
Quality 
Score 
Fee 
Score 
Total Score Rank Quality 
Score 
Fee Score Total 
Score 
Rank 
A 82 5.43 1.000 0.814 1.814 3 0.700 0.243 0.943 1 57.40 23.15 80.55 1 
B 76 5.14 0.927 0.860 1.787 4 0.651 0.258 0.909 3 53.20 25.11 78.31 3 
C 69 4.42 0.841 1.000 1.841 2 0.588 0.300 0.888 4 48.30 30.00 78.30 4 
D 73 4.62 0.890 0.957 1.847 1 0.623 0.287 0.910 2 51.10 28.64 79.74 2 
   Equation 7 (70/30) Equation 8 (70/30) Equation 9 (70/30) 
 
Consultant 
Identity 
Quality 
Mark 
Fee $M Quality 
Score 
Fee Score Total 
Score 
Rank Quality 
Score 
Fee 
Score 
Total Score Rank Quality 
Score 
Fee Score Total 
Score 
Rank 
 
 
A 82 5.43 0 6.86 6.86 1 0.700 0.244 0.456 1 0.700 0.271 0.971 1 
B 76 5.14 5.53 4.89 10.42 3 0.755 0.258 0.497 2 0.648 0.286 0.934 2 
C 69 4.42 13.19 0 13.19 4 0.832 0.300 0.532 4 0.588 0.300 0.888 4 
D 73 4.62 8.63 1.36 9.99 2 0.786 0.287 0.499 3 0.623 0.300 0.923 3 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Price/Quality Aggregation Methods using a Hypothetical Example
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Rec. Tender  No. of Competing Firm 16 Successful 
No. Qtr Consultants Ranking Consultant Identity 
Code 
1 4Qtr 95 3 3 4 
2 3Qtr 96 3 3 18 
3 3Qtr 96 3 2 18 
4 3Qtr 96 3 3 13 
5 4Qtr 96 3 3 17 
6 4Qtr 96 3 3 18 
7 4Qtr 96 3 1 16 
8 1Qtr 97 3 2 13 
9 2Qtr 97 3 1 16 
10 2Qtr 98 7 2 16 
11 2Qtr 98 3 1 16 
12 2Qtr 98 7 3 4 
13 2Qtr 98 7 2 11 
14 3Qtr 98 7 2 13 
15 3Qtr 98 3 2 16 
16 3Qtr 98 3 2 11 
17 2Qtr 99 3 1 16 
 
Table 2: Firm 16’s introductory bid performance information 
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Rec. 
No. 
Firm 16 
Quality 
Competitiveness 
 
(1) 
Average 
Competitor 
Quality 
Competitiveness 
(2) 
 
Difference 
 
 
(1) – (2) 
Lowest  
Tenderer 
Quality  
Competitiveness 
(3) 
 
Difference 
 
 
(1) – (3) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
0.700 
0.642 
0.672 
0.699 
0.690 
0.675 
0.700 
0.700 
0.700 
0.675 
0.683 
0.678 
0.679 
0.674 
0.700 
0.656 
0.685 
0.665 
0.690 
0.684 
0.691 
0.700 
0.697 
0.677 
0.686 
0.683 
0.656 
0.667 
0.659 
0.659 
0.655 
0.691 
0.682 
0.684 
0.035 
(0.048) 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
(0.021) 
0.023 
0.014 
0.017 
0.019 
0.016 
0.018 
0.021 
0.019 
0.009 
(0.025) 
0.001 
0.674 
0.680 
0.700 
0.682 
0.699 
0.694 
0.700 
0.675 
0.700 
0.694 
0.683 
0.699 
0.585 
0.693 
0.698 
0.663 
0.685 
0.026 
(0.038) 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.009) 
(0.018) 
0.000 
0.025 
0.000 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.021) 
0.094 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.000 
Av. 0.683 0.678 0.005 0.683 0.000 
S.D. 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.028 0.030 
C.V. 2.489 2.212 - 4.100 - 
 
Table 3: Firm 16’s quality competitiveness relative to the average competitor and lowest 
tenderer 
 
 25
 
 
Rec. 
No. 
Firm 16 
Fee 
Competitiveness 
 
(1) 
Average 
Competitor 
Fee 
Competitiveness 
(2) 
 
Difference 
 
 
(1) – (2) 
Lowest  
Tenderer 
Fee  
Competitiveness 
(3) 
 
Difference 
 
 
(1) – (3) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
0.200 
0.223 
0.300 
0.219 
0.295 
0.288 
0.290 
0.265 
0.300 
0.244 
0.300 
0.219 
0.181 
0.235 
0.155 
0.239 
0.300 
0.294 
0.288 
0.287 
0.278 
0.293 
0.291 
0.298 
0.263 
0.209 
0.201 
0.234 
0.183 
0.141 
0.195 
0.217 
0.250 
0.272 
(0.094) 
(0.065) 
0.013 
(0.059) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
(0.008) 
0.002 
0.091 
0.044 
0.066 
0.036 
0.040 
0.040 
(0.062) 
(0.011) 
0.028 
0.288 
0.300 
0.285 
0.300 
0.300 
0.300 
0.290 
0.300 
0.300 
0.255 
0.300 
0.219 
0.300 
0.255 
0.300 
0.300 
0.300 
(0.088) 
(0.077) 
0.015 
(0.081) 
(0.005) 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.035) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.000 
0.000 
(0.119) 
(0.020) 
(0.145) 
(0.061) 
0.000 
Av. 0.250 0.247 0.003 0.288 (0.038) 
S.D. 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.023 0.048 
C.V. 18.80 19.43 - 7.986 - 
 
Table 4: Firm 16’s fee competitiveness relative to the average competitor and lowest 
tenderer 
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Rec. 
No. 
Firm 16 
Overall 
Competitiveness 
 
(1) 
Average 
Competitor 
Overall 
Competitiveness 
(2) 
 
Difference 
 
 
(1) – (2) 
Lowest  
Tenderer 
Overall 
Competitiveness 
(3) 
 
Difference 
 
 
(1) – (3) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
0.900 
0.865 
0.972 
0.918 
0.986 
0.964 
0.990 
0.965 
1.000 
0.919 
0.983 
0.897 
0.860 
0.909 
0.855 
0.895 
0.985 
0.959 
0.978 
0.971 
0.969 
0.993 
0.987 
0.975 
0.949 
0.892 
0.857 
0.901 
0.842 
0.800 
0.850 
0.908 
0.932 
0.956 
(0.059) 
(0.113) 
0.001 
(0.051) 
(0.007) 
(0.023) 
0.015 
0.016 
0.108 
0.062 
0.082 
0.055 
0.060 
0.059 
(0.053) 
(0.037) 
0.029 
0.962 
0.980 
0.985 
0.982 
0.999 
0.994 
0.990 
0.975 
1.000 
0.949 
0.983 
0.918 
0.885 
0.948 
0.998 
0.963 
0.985 
(0.062) 
(0.115) 
(0.013) 
(0.064) 
(0.013) 
(0.030) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.030) 
0.000 
(0.021) 
(0.025) 
(0.039) 
(0.143) 
(0.068) 
0.000 
Av. 0.933 0.925 0.008 0.970 (0.037) 
S.D. 0.050 0.059 0.059 0.031 0.041 
C.V. 5.359 6.378 - 3.196 - 
 
Table 5: Firm 16’s overall competitiveness relative to the average competitor and lowest 
tenderer 
